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Abstract: 
The EU enlargement process is a work-in-progress topic and a difficult puzzle to be solved. But what this 
paper tries to propose is a simplified model that builds onto answering two main questions, that of why and 
when enlargement occurs. Considering the Western Balkan case, this paper has argued that both, the 
rational incentives of economic interest and reducing negative externalities of non-enlargement as well as 
constructivist/sociological incentives are by no doubts an important facilitator in the process of enlargement 
on both, demand and supply side. They may lead to different forms of institutionalization among the two 
parties, such as the Stabilization and Association Agreements Western Balkans is experiencing. This is still 
not sufficient enough for finalizing enlargement process, that is, signing the accession treaties. The 
motivations alone are insufficient to complete enlargement process since they may lead to other forms of 
cooperation but not full membership. The lengthy process of integrating Western Balkans into EU is the 
best argument in favour of such claim. In order to complete the process, adjustments at both demand and 
supply side are needed. For the final outcome of enlargement to come (signing accession treaty) the 
applicant states have to adjust to (comply with) the EU requirements while EU itself has to adjust 
(transform) its institutions to be capable of functioning when the new countries are being accepted. In the 
contrary, if the EU is not being ready to accept new countries (capacity issue) and/or if the candidate 
countries do not accomplish (at least) the Copenhagen criteria (the case of the Western Balkans) the 
enlargement process may be postponed till the necessary and/or sufficient conditions are fulfil. In the 
contrary blocking or delaying tactics may be a way to postpone the process till the needed transformations 
are achieved. The experience of the previous enlargement (lately with Bulgaria, Rumania or Turkey) is the 
best argument. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Any definition of the cases to be studied is problematic and questionable. Without entering in endless 
debates of who is Western Balkans I will use the term Western Balkans referring to what has been defined 
as “ex-Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania”. The term Western Balkans was officially introduced in 
1998 by the Austrian Presidency of the EU once Bulgaria and Romania were allowed to open membership 
talks with the EU. It includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia. I suggest seeing the term contextually; since for the purpose of this paper the formula above 
includes countries that are undergoing the same process (that of the EU integration) although at different 
speed. 
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Introduction 
Being for many years divided, Europe found its historical possibility to re-unite with its 
other part only after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’2. It was this particular moment, seeing it 
rather from a rationalist point of view of managing the new created European security, 
economic and political order or from a constructivist point of view of a pan-European 
idea and values, that open the way for European enlargement Eastward. Now after more 
than 15 years, were the CEEs country have already become full EU members, all the 
attention is focused into the EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans as being the 
next step of fulfilling the overall ‘project of unifying the continent’. This fact has 
attracted the attention of many scholarly works who try to analyze step by step the 
different stages Western Balkan is going through towards EU membership target. The 
article joins this debate on the perspective of Western Balkans entering EU by trying to 
put forward the questions of Whys and When enlarging to the Western Balkans. 
The literature on eastern enlargement regularly makes a split. On the one side there is the 
‘Enlargement literature’ focusing exclusively on EU, its decisions and interest on the 
Enlargement issue and on the other side there is the ‘Accession literature’ analyzing 
enlargement only from the candidate country perspective. (Schimmelfennig, 2002b: 2-3; 
Lendvai 2004: 319-320). Taking only one side will be a truncated analysis and will limit 
us in a full understanding of the Enlargement issue. That is why in order to make the 
‘linkage’ between the two I consider Enlargement as the process launched by EU while 
accession of Western Balkan countries as its final outcome. It is of crucial importance to 
clarify from the very first beginning that Enlargement here is seen not simply as a 
territorial expansion of adding new states into the union but rather as “a complex and 
multidimensional process” (Scherpereel 2005: 364). For this reason enlargement is 
treated here firstly as a “multiple step process” (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 11) 
and secondly as a double-side process where both, the applicants states and EU will be 
considered in answering why and when enlargement will happen in the WB. The point 
 
2 The term “iron curtain" was first introduced by Winston Churchill in one of his speeches entitle "The 
Sinews of Peace" given in the Westminster College on March 5, 1946. This term entered into general use 
and attracted immediate international attention, and had incalculable impact upon public opinion in the 
United States and in Western Europe. It is greatly cited also after ’90 as the ‘fall of the iron curtain’. See: 
Churchill Winston. Sinews of Peace, 5 March, 1946, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri 
<http://www.hpol.org/churchill/> 
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here is that to better understand enlargement process one needs firstly to consider the 
many stages enlargement process involves and secondly investigate simultaneously both 
of its sides; the supply side (EU)3 and the demand side (Western Balkans). 
 
The main and most arguably question I try to address is whether the driving forces (being 
them rational or constructivist incentives) for enlargement are sufficient enough to 
understand Enlargement process or does other factors need to be taken into consideration 
for the final outcome (accession treaty)? 
 
 I. The whys of Enlargement 
1. What Motivation stands behind enlargement process  
The cornerstone of the Enlargement debate focuses on trying to find what are the 
incentives (driving forces) that rest behind the enlargement process? The arguments have 
been given from both, the rationalist and the constructivist perspective. The most 
fundamental difference is that they assume different logic of action, that is, a rationalist 
argument follows a logic of consequentiality while a constructivist argument builds on a 
logic of appropriateness.4 The dominant and the most elaborated arguments derive from a 
logic of consequentiality and are based on a cost-benefit calculation. Following such a 
logic, enlargement can be seen as a means of magnifying political strength of Europe 
within and in the international arena, others see enlargement as an opportunity to bring 
peace, consolidate democracy or boost economic performance in Europe. There are these 
issues of economic and political concern that may sufficiently convince both actors to 
cooperate aiming at a full exploitation of their own interest. The other alternative view 
builds on a logic of appropriateness based on norms and ideas. Following such logic, 
enlargement is justified on the bases of common shared European values and beliefs. 
Such assumption of the rational self-interest perspective for increasing material and 
political gains or the constructivist view of common shared values and beliefs may both 
justify a further step toward enlargement but they are contextual and as such have to be 
                                                 
3 Here, EU will be referred to as a supply side of enlargement where other important factors influencing EU 
politics of enlargement (such as the member state or public opinions) are considered under the overall 
umbrella of EU. 
4 For more on the issue see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005 
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investigated further considering the cases. As Scherpereel has observed some 
combination of these motivations may be present but further and thin investigation for 
judging which reasons matter most requires close attention to particular cases. (2005: 
349) 
 
1.1 Economic incentives   
Economic gains and material benefits have been an argument behind the motives of a 
further EU enlargement. Economists seem to agree that trade integration will benefit the 
EU economies in the aggregate as well as it will open new market for EU exports in their 
close proximity (Schimmelfennig 1999). Such logic is been reinforced by the findings in 
a latest report of the Commission examining the macroeconomic performance and 
outcomes of expanding the EU-15 to the 10 new Member States.5 The overall impression 
is that the enlargement of the EU in the long term will be positive and generate benefits 
for the entire enlarged Union. Such an optimistic view, where “enlargement is seen as a 
very good deal for both the EU incumbents and the new members” (Baldwin et al 1997: 
125) comes from studies that measured the economic effects of Eastern Enlargement. 
There are these economic benefits of enlargements that dominate the rhetoric of the EU 
officials who usually point out and enforce the important of such economic incentives in 
‘promoting’ enlargement.6
 
Investigating the EU Enlargement case to the Western Balkans one may argue that the 
economic incentives are more a motivation for WB countries while as far as concerning 
the EU it may be discussable. The economic calculation can work as motivations for ‘the 
applicant countries because of the full access to the EU’s market and to the economic 
 
5 “The extension of the Internal Market and the rapid integration of the new Member States in the EU 
economy have made it possible for enterprises to take advantage of cost and location advantages and to 
seek improvements in profitability through the spatial reallocation of production. These efficiency gains, 
however difficult to measure, will continue to be available to enterprises and to consumers as the EU-25 
economy adapts to structural change. Structural reforms are clearly necessary in order for the EU to realize 
the promise of productivity growth through production relocation and specialization in the Internal 
Market.” (European Commission 2006:1). 
6  The Monetary Affairs Commissioner, Joaquin Almunia, commenting the results of the European 
Commission report (2006) stressed that “The re-unification of Europe is not only a huge political 
achievement it is also an economic success … We all win as the citizens in the new Member States see 
their standards of living increasing …The enlargement is helping the EU cope better with the new world 
economic order”.(European Commission-Press releases 2006). 
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benefits of its common policies and common budget (Graham 2001:2). By analogical 
comparison to CEEs, the Western Balkans by joining the EU are more likely to raise their 
output and growth rates through stipulating entrepreneurship, foreign direct investments 
(FDI) and technology transfer.7 Here the argument is that “the process of accession can 
virtually transform a country,” and the examples to be considered are the transformation 
of the economy in Poland and other East European countries.8 Such economic benefits 
may raise the preferences of the Balkans country to join the EU since a full membership 
will provide unrestricted access to the single European market as well as other technical 
and financial assistance, rapid economic growth, and prosperity. Though “the economic 
benefits of enlargement unquestionably constitute a powerful force driving the demand 
for membership” (Mattli and Plümper, 2002: 558) it does constitute a lesser powerful 
driving force if the supply side (EU) for membership is considered. Although EU is the 
main trade partner of practically all the countries in the Western Balkans (Gligorov, 
Holzner and Landesmann. 2003: 34; WIIW 2006: 1) accounting for close to 60% of their 
total trade (Ilirjani 2005: 9) it still can be considered economically unimportant since the 
region “has been mostly driven by consumption rather than investment or exports” 
(WIIW 2006: 1). Such a reality may oppose the economic motivations of EU enlargement 
into Balkans and can be an argument against rather than pro because the material benefit 
the region brings is very modest and not significant at all. The only argument that really 
needs to be taken under consideration is that “the cost of enlargement is slight compared 
with the cost of non-enlargement” (Prodi 2002: 5). Would it have cost less for EU to 
spend in accession strategies rather than in military missions or humanitarian aid in the 
Balkans? The contributions by the Union and its Member States to the region is estimated 
around € 8.3 billion (1991-1999) where the largest share of this EC/EU funds, almost 50 
%, has been in the form of humanitarian aid (Uvalic 2001: 16). Only in the period 1991-
94 the EU spending on humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia 
amounted to some $2.4 bn (Bojicic et. al 1995: 48). Such enormous sum of money 
 
7 For the argument on CEECs see Grabbe 2001: 24. 
8 Katinka Barysch, chief economist at the Center for European Reform, in London. Cited from James 
Kanter. 2006 . “EU pushes its expansion forward” International Herald Tribune, June 12 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/12/news/eu.php> 
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provided by the EU in different forms of military or financial aid could have had better 
results if could have been allocated in the processes of enlarging EU towards Balkans. 
 
In overall the economic incentive argument is thick and cannot explain enlargement (the 
membership) rather it can lead to other forms of (economic) cooperation (like in case of 
Switzerland or Norway) and keep the country outside of a full membership (as the case 
with Turkey). The only rational initiative from EU’s part may be the extension of the 
existing Customs Union into the whole of the Western Balkans - as the case with Turkey 
- so to expand and penetrate more markets.  
 
1.2 reducing negative externalities of non-enlarging 
Even though the potential countries may not provided economic growth and prosperity to 
the union because they simply may be poor and commercially unattractive countries, a 
(rational) motivation still may exist for accepting these countries into an organization as a 
consequence of negative externalities originating by leaving them outside (Mattli and 
Plümper 2002: 553).  
For the EU such a negative externality of potential crisis spillover from neighbouring 
countries may constrain the Union to speed up Enlargement or at least seek closer ties 
with the outsider countries (Mattli and Plümper 2002: 554).  
In the past decade Western Balkans had suffer from deadly violent ethnic (the dissolution 
of ex-Yugoslavia) and civilian (’97 disorder in Albania) conflicts. There are these events 
in the Balkans that indeed have shaped the attitude of EU and its members regarding the 
potential enlargement to the Western Balkans as a strategy to prevent them happen again 
in this part of Europe. It is the ‘stability issue’, the new rhetoric used not only by 
politicians but also even by academics that had dominate the discourse of European 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans. It is this risk of political and peace instability 
in the region that had made all to agree that the only and the best way to avert this 
potential risk is to integrate all Western Balkan countries within the EU. In this sense 
enlargement can be seen as an instrument to stabilize the region suffering from conflict 
disputes and economical underdevelopment. 
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The logic behind a strategic enlargement rest on the fact that the perspective of 
membership for the Western Balkan state would definitely reduce; firstly the threats to 
stability in this part of the region from ethnic conflicts which as a consequence will de-
stabilize all Europe, and secondly the risks to the reforms stop from the increasing 
popular dissatisfaction and political unrest. In this context, enlargement can be seen as 
the strongest instrument to be used by EU in order to have a full control and neutralize 
any such negative externalities.  
On the other side, the Western Balkans themselves are facing also negative externalities 
being outside EU, especially after the joining of Rumania and Bulgaria. It is to be 
acknowledge that after Bulgaria and Romania accede to EU, the countries in the Western 
Balkan region had become an enclave on its own surrounded all over by EU Member 
States. This geographic circumstance in itself can stand as a sufficient reason for the 
Balkan countries to focus on enlargement as a matter of priority since “either non-
enlargement, limited expansion, or ‘differential integration’ could lead to a long-term 
isolation and marginalization of the excluded countries” (Bugajski 2001: 42). Remaining 
out of the EU and at the same time surrounded by EU countries will cause for the 
Western Balkans countries, above all, isolation. The example may be comparable to what 
Kaliningrad region9 had been suffering. The argument here is that the Western Balkans, 
being surrounded by the EU member states and at the same time being cut off from the 
EU, may face various negative effects in their political, economic, security-related as 
well as psychological issues. This situation may bring about another fatigue added to the 
already weaknesses of the region connected to their past. 
Both negative externalities are related and depend on each other. A left out of the 
Western Balkans may contribute negatively on the stability of the region and as a 
consequence on the entire European continent. This closed-end negative effect makes EU 
 
9 “Kaliningrad appears to be burdened with a multitude of problems, but this also applies to most of the 
other eighty-eight constituent parts of Russia. Is there anything that really makes this small 'island' in the 
Baltic Sea area unique — a case that warrants special attention and treatment? The argument advanced here 
is that this is indeed the case. There are good reasons for placing Kaliningrad in a category of its own. The 
oblast deserves consideration because of being cut off from the Russian mainland by foreign states. This 
factor has had — and continues to have — a significant effect that exacerbates various political, economic, 
security-related and, not least, psychological challenges”. See: Pertti, J., Dewar, S. and Fairlie, L., (2000) 
“The Kaliningrad Puzzle: A Russian Region within the European Union” Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute. Available at < http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/jop06/> 
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itself more sensitive to developments into the Western Balkans since they may have 
severe consequences not only for the EU member states surrounding the region but also 
for the union as a whole. Being an enclave inside the EU borders, the region stability may 
have a negative domino effect at any moment if left alone. Having such geopolitical 
interests in the region is a quite enough argument to move EU towards finding different 
forms of cooperation with the Western Balkan countries as to influence the course of 
events there. The only and more efficient way for EU to legitimate its influence in the 
Western Balkans though is through the process of enlargement. The Macedonian case 
rests as the best example where the signature of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Macedonia was the strongest incentive EU used 
to pressure the two parties in the conflict for concluding a political deal (Piana, 2002: 
212). The same enlargement incentive was uses in the most recent developments were 
EU offered a ‘fast-track’ membership to Serbia (the signing of the SAA) in return for 
relaxing Serbian position on Kosovo. 
 
Although some scholars seem to find some shortcomings and limitations (Mattli and 
Plümper 2005: 56) to the argument of ‘negative externalities’, we have argued here that 
they are an important factor, at least, in the EU enlargement process towards the Western 
Balkans. The negative externalities deriving by not enlarging south-east of Europe are not 
only a matter of concern for the Western Balkans stability but furthermore they may be a 
serious threat to disrupt the union’s stability, security, and prosperity as long as the 
political or social unrest in the Western Balkans is an issue of concern. 
 
1.3 normative claims 
But beside these tangible (economic and political) incentives of cost-benefit calculations, 
the Western Balkans countries are a constituent part of Europe which gives them the 
moral and legal rights to be part of EU. Traditionally, the region has been seen as the 
dark other side of “western civilization” standing contrary to what may have been 
European values and norms (Todorova, 1994: 482). But the Western Balkans from the 
‘90s on had done progress, leaving back the era of ‘Balkanization’ and catching up with 
transition towards pluralist democracy and market economy. Recent research has shown 
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that “ultimately, it is Europe (its norms and values) which stands as the common 
denominator around which a new collective identity of the Balkans has begun to 
crystallise (Bechev, 2006a: 22, emphasis added). Furthermore, beside even the many 
problems that Western Balkans are facing nowadays, what is probably most important 
here is that the process of integration is now irreversible even in a country like Serbia, 
where possible political changes are likely to influence only the speed but not its general 
course (Uvalic, 2003: 79, emphasis added). All this does mean that joining EU now 
stands as the only long-range vision for the Western Balkans. By now, the logic and 
momentum of European integration have made the inclusion of the Balkan states a 
foregone conclusion, a strategic inevitability (Balkan forum, 2002: 6). 
A normative proximity to European values and European orientation can be detected into 
the rhetoric of the political elites of the Western Balkans countries. Reference to 
European standards and values has become the vocabulary of the politicians of the 
region. Where even in the hardest case such as Serbia (because of EU support on Kosovo 
independence) still the winning president Tadic’s campaign was concentrated on EU 
integration and values.10  The role of EU and its membership ‘carrot’ has been as a 
magnet and source of inspiration for the region efforts to built modern states and 
societies” (Bechev, 2006b: 23). All such actual reference to EU and moreover being (in 
future) a full member will improve the Western Balkans countries image. By referring to 
or coming closer to EU, the Western Balkans states may ‘legitimize’ in the eyes of their 
electorate and world wide their progress and democratic consolidation as EU is 
exclusively a ‘club’ of liberal-democracies.  
On the other side, failing to bring Western Balkans to European norms and values will 
still harm EU ‘credibility’ also. It was the credibility cost of non-enlargement, which 
made the EU members state not to oppose enlargement perspective to then CEE 
countries. It will be again the credibility cost of non-enlarging further to Western Balkans 
since EU, at least, has the moral duty to ‘complete Europe’ 11  by enlarging south-
eastward. At the European Council of Copenhagen ‘a small’ or ‘a delay’ enlargement 
would have had a detrimental impact on the EU’s credibility not only on the future 
 
10 The slogan was “For a European Serbia” 
11 Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated that “We feel we should take the opportunity to create a complete 
Europe.” Business Week, 3 February 1997, 18 (Cited from Schimmelfennig 2001:71). 
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candidate countries but even in the world (Dehousse and Coussens 2001: 10; Grabbe 
2001: 52&60). At the present situation, with the ‘Lisbon treaty ratification difficulty’ and 
as a consequence ‘the rising of the enlargement fatigue’, the issue of credibility for the 
EU comes again at the fore. Moving a step back of enlargement because of ‘the 
integration fatigue’ at a time when Western Balkans needs Europe will put the EU 
reputation at stake. Such a “loss in credibility can cause severe consequences” 
(Schimmelfennig 1999) for EU image of a successful actor not only at Western Balkans 
eyes but also worldwide. 
 
 
In sum, both tangible (economic incentives, reducing negative externalities of non-
enlargement) and social (normative claims) incentives are all jointly a powerful and 
considerable factor in triggering EU enlargement seeing from the supply as well as the 
demand side. Other than incentives, they are also a way that justifies any form of 
cooperation or even more institutionalized arrangements among both actors. They 
comprehensively can give as a full picture of why(s) enlarging to the Western Balkans but 
they could not provide us with when enlargement will happen. 
 
 
II. The when of Enlargement 
2.1 Enlargement as (step-, many-) Institutionalization12 (different modes)  
Such motivations create opportunities for further cooperation among the two actors, and 
once such cooperation is achieved and the perspective exists they can put pressure for 
more contractual relations. Achieving any substantial institutional arrangements is an 
important step toward enlargement process but there may be various mode of 
institutionalization13 till the process concludes. Even though many ‘special institutional 
                                                 
12 In a more general point of view, the enlargement of a regional organization can be conceptualized as 
suggested by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002 and 2005), where the enlargement of an organization 
can be defined ‘as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules 
and norms.’ 
13 Institutionalization in the context of the EU enlargement process can be broadly understood as “the 
establishment of special institutional relations” (Schimmelfennig 2002: 601) between the EU and the 
applicant states. 
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relations’ may be achieved through different agreements, the enlargement processes will 
not be finalized until the Treaty of Accession14 is signed. The process toward Accession 
(signing the Treaty of accession) embodies a number of steps to go through till the 
process comes to an end. The accession procedure involves some major steps. A first 
introductory step, based upon ‘Stabilization and Association Agreements’ which are 
international treaties in which the applicant state declares its willingness to standardize 
with EU norms and law; in a second phase, based upon ‘Accession Partnerships’, the 
applicant state commits itself to precise obligations with regard to specific means for 
democratization, economic stabilization and industrial development; in a third step, 
membership proceeds under the condition that all transformation efforts have been 
evaluated positively ( Behr, 2007: 249). 
 
In the case of the Western Balkans the Stabilization and Association process (SAp) is the 
actual phase of the EU – Western Balkans contractual relations which lead (and will lead) 
the EU in signing with the countries of the Western Balkans the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAAs). The signing of Stabilization and Association 
Agreement15 is to be considered as the first step toward enlargement since it introduces 
the status of a ‘potential candidate’ for EU membership to the Western Balkan countries 
with a long-term prospect of accession16. 
But not all the countries have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the 
EU.17 Furthermore they differ in their degree of integration with the EU, where only 
Croatia and Macedonia have the candidate status. In sum it can be said that the Western 
Balkan countries present differences in the speed and modalities of enlargement process. 
The reason beside this variety in speed and modalities of enlargement can be attributed to 
 
14 The Treaty of accession or usually called accession is an agreement between the member states of 
European Union and the candidate countries 
15 The SAAs are an up-dated version of the EU Agreements and resemble in term of structure and content 
the Europe Agreements signed in ‘90s between the EU and then-candidate countries of Central East Europe 
16 The EU “objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political 
and economic mainstream of Europe .... All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU 
membership” (Council of the European Union 2000: paragraph 67)  
17 To date only Albania, Croatia and Macedonia have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
with the EU while the SAA remains pending for the other countries. 
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the different degrees of compliance with EU requirements18. The more democratic a non-
member state, the higher its possibility of establishing institutionalized relations and 
being admitted to the EU. This assumption implies that for any potential country to open 
the accession negotiations with EU it is obligatory (at least in theory) that those countries 
first should have reached EU liberal values and norms before any negotiation starts. The 
more a Western Balkan state complied with EU liberal norms, the more likely it is to 
establish institutionalized relations with and to apply for EU membership. The defining 
characteristics of the Western Balkans states had to conform to the principles and norms 
of liberal democracy. As far as the Western Balkan states fall short of complying with the 
EU requirements other intermediate forms (other than accession) may be introduced till 
these states will fully adapt to the fundamental beliefs and practices that constitute EU. 
As a consequence of this logic not any institutional tie will necessary lead to accession it 
rather may only put pressure for changes on both actors. 
 
2.2 Enlargement as a double-side transformation (adjustment) process 
By conceptualizing enlargement as a process and not as an event we imply 
transformation. In this perspective enlargement, as a concept, is no longer simply about 
adding states to EU by expanding the geographic area – it is also about substantial 
qualitative change (Faber and Wolfgang, 2006: 2-3; Hafner, 1999: 784). It is reasonable 
to assume change since both actors (the EU and the state that wants to join) need not only 
share the same values and norms, but they should be ready and capable of being governed 
under the same institutions. Regarding the demand side (candidate countries seeking 
membership), the transformation meant adapting to Copenhagen criteria, -that is 
construct a market economy and a (liberal) democratic state- and to the Madrid 
administrative capacity criterion19. For EU (the supply side) there is a need to transform 
its institutions as to be capable to function when accepting the new countries.  
                                                 
18 the core elements of the EU requirements are the Copenhagen Criteria asking the (potential) candidate 
country to achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to adopt the 
common rules, standards and policies of the Union” See: The Copenhagen Criteria, DG Enlargement – at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm>  
19  Additional to Copenhagen criteria of a market economy and a (liberal) democratic state were the 
administrative criterion introduced by the Madrid European Council in December 1995. All these criteria 
are set up to led the candidate countries into the necessary reforms 
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Right after accession of the CEEs countries the issue of ‘swallowing’ the last 
enlargement becomes an issue before EU next enlargement.20 It was at the Salzburg EU 
meeting where for the first time “EU notes that its absorption capacity has to be taken 
into account.”21 Furthermore the rejection of the new EU constitution by the French and 
Dutch referendums in 2005 represented a backlash against the future enlargements. 
These inner conditions put the union into a “period of reflection on the future of Europe” 
(EurActiv, 2006) where “some form of institutional reform will be necessary for the 
enlarged EU to function effectively and more if it is to expand further” (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2006). Even though the enlargement of EU towards CEE countries 
“transformed dramatically the institutions of the community” (Fierke and Wiener, 1999: 
722) there is still a necessity for institutional and financial reform that would allow the 
EU to continue to expand its membership further into the Western Balkans. Such a need 
for drastic reforms before enlargement happen was also recognized by the Austrian EU 
Presidency Conclusions (15-16 June 2006) where still “it will be important to ensure in 
future that the Union is able to function politically, financially and institutionally as it 
enlarges”. (Council of the European Union 2006: 18 paragraph 53)  
 
2.3 Necessary and sufficient transformations for enlargement? 
What happens if not transform? 
Finally, enlargement is evidently a process of contractual relations among EU and the 
applicant states which before finalized puts pressure for transformations on both sides, 
the EU and the applicants with the later being more obvious. This transformation 
although asymmetrical is required on both sided. On the demand-side the “change may be 
seen as quasi-mechanical22 since it follows from the routine application of stable criteria 
for entry” (Olsen 2002: 927), while on the supply-side the change are more of a 
                                                 
20 «Janez Jansa: … As I've said there's only one alternative and this is the European perspective, but we are 
aware that before the European Union is able to take this step to enlarge in the future, we have to swallow 
the last enlargement. I think we need five to 10 years to do that». Quote in EuroNews (2006) Slovenia's 
Janez Jansa on the challenges of the EU presidency and adopting the euro, Interview. 
21 Presidency of the European Union – AUSTRIA 2006, The Salzburg Declaration, Salzburg EU/ Western 
Balkans Joint Press Statement, 11 March. 
22 Olsen argues that “in less automatic situations the underlying process may be one of arguing and 
persuading” (2002: 927) 
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deliberate (vulnerability, willingness) character where the capability23 issue is of great 
importance. For the applicant countries, complying with the EU rules and norms is a 
necessary condition toward accession while the sufficient condition for the treaty of 
accession to be sign is if EU itself is transform as such that a further enlargement is 
possible and not impinges its integration. Such transformations, at both actors, are 
gradual and may take time depending on the inner conditions of each player. The 
complexity of such process where the dynamics of change requires a form of mutual 
adjustment at both camps is an explanation of why enlargement or even the setting of the 
date of accession of the candidate country may delay (the Western Balkan countries is a 
pure example of a missing timeline of when enlargement will occur). 
 
The question here is what the options are if such necessary and sufficient transformations 
do not fully take place?  
Considering the most typical example of Turkey 24  or even Bulgaria and Romania, 
delaying or postponement of membership seems to be the case. Such option of postponed 
membership is frequently referred to as a way to keep the momentum of reforms 
(Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 9) giving enlargement a cyclic form, meaning that if 
necessary and sufficient transformations are not fully achieved we are to expect rather an 
upgrade institutional tie but not accession.  
 
Conclusion 
The EU enlargement process is an under-research (work-in-progress) topic and a difficult 
puzzle to be solved. But what this paper tries to propose is a simplified model that builds 
onto answering two main questions, that of why and when enlargement occurs. 
Considering the Western Balkan case, this paper has argued that the rational incentives of 
reducing negative externalities of non-enlarging and economic interests as well as the 
 
23 Capability will depend on EU itself (budget and absorption capacity), member state and EU citizens’ 
perceptions. For more on the argument see Jano, D. (forthcoming) “EU - Western Balkans Relations: The 
Many EU Approaches”, IUIES Journal on International Issues, special issue on “The Mediterranean as the 
new center for Europe: On the waterfront of European policies”, number 1, 2008 
24 Turkey submitted its application for membership in June 1987 but it took more than ten years before the 
EU granted it the status of candidate in December 1999. 
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normative claims are by no doubts an important facilitator in the process of enlargement 
on both, demand and supply side. They may lead to different forms of institutionalization 
among the two parties, such as the Stabilization and Association Agreements.  
This is still not sufficient enough for finalizing enlargement process (accession treaties). 
The motivations alone are insufficient to complete enlargement process since they may 
lead to other forms of cooperation but not full membership, as the lengthy process of 
integrating Western Balkans into EU have shown. In order to complete the process some 
form of transformation is needed from both demand and supply side. For the final 
outcome of enlargement to come (that is signing accession treaty) the applicant states 
have to comply with the EU requirements while EU have to transform its institutions so 
to be capable to function when the new countries are being accepted. In the contrary, if 
the EU is not being ready to accept new countries (capacity issue) or/and if the candidate 
countries do not accomplish the Copenhagen criteria (the case of the Western Balkans) 
the enlargement process may be postponed till the necessary and/or sufficient conditions 
are fulfill. In the contrary blocking or delaying tactics25 may be a way to postpone the 
process till the needed transformations are achieved. The experience of the previous 
enlargement (lately with Bulgaria, Rumania or Turkey) is the best argument.  
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